| Type | Scene | Result | TrusDevice Pro | Fingerprint | Seon | CredoLab | Sift | Shield | PerimeterX |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Device Fingerprint Compatibility | iOS 9.0 and above, including iOS 16, etc. | Able to collect device info and generate device ID | ✅ | ✅(ios12 and above) | ✅(ios9 and above) | ✅(ios11 and above) | ✅(ios9.2 and above) | ✅(ios9 and above) | ✅(ios11 and above) |
| Device fingerprint uniqueness | Different apps (with different package names) on the same device | Device fingerprints/ID matches | ✅ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ |
| The same app on two unique devices (including the case of the same device model and the same system version) | Device fingerprint/ID should not match. Each device to have its own unique device fingeprint/ID | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | |
| Device Fingerprint Stability | Uninstall and reinstall | Device fingerprints/ID are consistent before and after reinstallation | ✅ | ✅ | ❌ | ✅ | ❌ | ✅ | ❌ |
| Clear all app data | Device fingerprints/ID are consistent before and after clearing all app data | ✅ | ✅ | ❌ | ✅ | ❌ | ✅ | ❌ | |
| Disable all app permissions except network permissions and clear app data | Device fingerprints/ID are consistent before and after disabling all permissions | ✅ | ✅ | ❌ | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | |
| Modify the common information of the device system (brand, model, IDFA, IDFV, etc.) through the machine modification tool | Device fingerprint/ID still matches with before modification | ✅ | ✅ | ❌ | ✅ | ❌ | ✅ | ❌ | |
| Device system upgrade | Device fingerprints/ID are consistent before and after system upgrade | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | |
| Factory reset (including iOS 14 and above, etc.) | The device fingerprints/ID are the same before and after the device is restored to factory settings | ✅ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | |
| Device Fingerprint Risk Identification | Secondary packaging | Ability to identify secondary packaged unofficial apps | ✅ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | ✅ | ❌ |
| Replay attack | Ability to identify replay attacks | ✅ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | |
| Device location information has been tampered with | Ability to identify tampering of location information | ✅ | ✅ | ❌ | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | - | |
| No SIM card inserted | Can identify whether the device is inserted with a SIM card | ✅ | ❌ | ❌ | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | |
| The device uses an HTTP proxy | Can identify HTTP proxy risks | ✅ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | ✅ | |
| The device uses a VPN proxy | Can identify VPN proxy risks | ✅ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | ✅ | ❌ | |
| Jailbreak | Ability to identify jailbreak risks | ✅ | ❌ | ✅ | ❌ | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | |
| The device is an emulator | Ability to recognize emulators | ✅ | ❌ | ✅ | ❌ | ✅ | ✅ | ❌ | |
| The device uses the machine modification tool to modify the device parameter information | Ability to identify mainstream modification tools | ✅ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | ✅ | ✅ | ❌ | |
| The device has scripts and group control tools installed (tools that are used to control multiple devices from single terminal - device farm/device group) | Can identify mainstream scripting/group control tools | ✅ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | ✅ | ❌ | |
| The device is equipped with an M chip | Devices capable of recognizing M-chips | ✅ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | ✅ | ✅ | - | |
| The device is not logged into the iCloud account | Able to identify login iCloud account | ✅ | ❌ | ✅ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | |
| Security and Stability | Code Protection | The device fingerprint SDK and JS have code protection mechanisms (such as VMP), which effectively resist black hat cracking attempts to manipulate code logic and falsify data | ✅ (OLLVM, VMP) | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ |
| Downgrade | Intercepting and sending collection requests in the iOS environment can still generate device fingerprints normally | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | |
| Anti packet capture | iOS has the ability to prevent packet capture | ✅ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | ✅ |